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APPROACHES TO ANALYSIS WITH INFINITESIMALS
FOLLOWING ROBINSON, NELSON, AND OTHERS
PETER FLETCHER, KAREL HRBACEK, VLADIMIR KANOVEI,
MIKHAIL G. KATZ, CLAUDE LOBRY, AND SAM SANDERS
Abstract. This is a survey of several approaches to the frame-
work for working with infinitesimals and infinite numbers, orig-
inally developed by Abraham Robinson in the 1960s, and their
constructive engagement with the Cantor–Dedekind postulate and
the Intended Interpretation hypothesis. We highlight some applica-
tions including (1) Loeb’s approach to the Lebesgue measure, (2) a
radically elementary approach to the vibrating string, (3) true in-
finitesimal differential geometry. We explore the relation of Robin-
son’s and related frameworks to the multiverse view as developed
by Hamkins.
Keywords: axiomatisations, infinitesimal, nonstandard analy-
sis, ultraproducts, superstructure, set-theoretic foundations, mul-
tiverse, naive integers, intuitionism, soritical properties, ideal ele-
ments, protozoa.
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1. Of sets and automobiles: a parable
The last third of the 19th century saw (at least) two dynamic inno-
vations: set theory and the automobile. Consider the following parable.
A silvery family sedan is speeding down the highway. It enters heavy
traffic. Every epsilon of the road requires a new delta of patience on
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the part of the passengers. The driver’s inquisitive daughter Sarah,1
sitting in the front passenger seat, discovers a mysterious switch in the
glove compartment. With a click, the sedan spreads wings and lifts off
above the highway congestion in an infinitesimal instant. Soon it is a
mere silvery speck in an infinite expanse of the sky. A short while later
it lands safely on the front lawn of the family’s home.
Sarah’s cousin Georg2 refuses to believe the story: true Sarah’s father
is an NSA man, but everybody knows that Karl Benz’s 1886 Patent-
Motorwagen had no wing option!
At a less parabolic level, some mathematicians feel that, on the
one hand, “It is quite easy to make mistakes with infinitesimals, etc.”
(Quinn [137, p. 31]) while, as if by contrast, “Modern definitions are
completely selfcontained, and the only properties that can be ascribed
to an object are those that can be rigorously deduced from the defi-
nition. . . Definitions that are modern in this sense were developed in
the late 1800s.” (ibid., p. 32).
We will have opportunity to return to Sarah, cousin Georg, switches,
and the heroic “late 1800s” in the sequel; see in particular Section 7.4.
2. Introduction
The framework created by Abraham Robinson in the 1960s and
called by him “nonstandard analysis” is an active research area fea-
turing many applications in other fields,3 its own journal (Journal of
Logic and Analysis),4 and high-profile advocates like Terry Tao;5 see
e.g., Tao [160], Tao–Vu [161]. The time may be ripe for a survey of
some of the approaches to the field.
1For the literary career of this character see Kanovei–Katz–Schaps [86].
2This character similarly made a (cameo) appearance in the final section of
Kanovei–Katz–Schaps [86, pp. 17–18].
3See Section 6 and Stroyan–Luxemburg [157], Henle–Kleinberg [68], Arkeryd [4],
Lutz–Goze [120], Keisler [106], Albeverio et al. [1], Wallet [168], van den Berg [163],
Callot [29], Rubio [146], Diener–Diener [36], Henson [69], Ross [145], Jin [83],
Kanovei–Shelah [93], Kanovei–Lyubetskii [89], Goldbring [52], van den Dries–
Goldbring [165], Nowik–Katz [129], Prazˇa´k–Slav´ık [135]; this list of applications
is by no means comprehensive.
4See http://www.logicandanalysis.org
5The field has also had its share of high-profile detractors like Errett Bishop
[22] and Alain Connes [32]. Their critiques were analyzed in Katz–Katz [95],
Katz–Leichtnam [98], Kanovei–Katz–Mormann [88], and Sanders [150]; see also
material in Section 5.10 around note 30. For further details on Connes and
the taming of differential geometry see note 38. Additional criticisms were
voiced by J. Earman [40], K. Easwaran [41], H. M. Edwards [42], G. Ferraro [45],
J. Grabiner [56], J. Gray [57], P. Halmos [60], H. Ishiguro [82], K. Schubring [151],
4 P.F., K. H., V. K., M. K., C. L., AND S. S.
2.1. Audience. The text presupposes some curiosity about infinitesi-
mals in general and Robinson’s framework in particular. While the text
is addressed to a somewhat informed audience not limited to specialists
in the field, an elementary introduction is provided in Section 3.
Professional mathematicians and logicians curious about Robinson’s
framework, as well as mathematically informed philosophers are one
possible (proper) subset of the intended audience, as are physicists,
engineers, and economists who seem to have few inhibitions about using
terms like infinitesimal and infinite number.6
2.2. The CD+II mindset. A survey of this sort necessarily enters
into a relationship of constructive (if not subversive) engagement with
a pair of assumptions commonly held among mathematicians, namely
(1) the Cantor–Dedekind postulate (CD) identifying the line in
physical space with the real number line (see Ehrlich [43] and
Katz–Katz [96]), and
(2) the Intended Interpretation hypothesis (II), entailing an identi-
fication of a standard N in its set-theoretic context, on the one
hand, with ordinary intuitive counting numbers, on the other.
We will deal with the II in more detail in Section 7.1. How the engage-
ment with the CD+II mindset plays itself out should become clearer
in the sequel.
2.3. Summary of perspectives. This article was inspired in part by
the posting of Joel Hamkins at Math Overflow [65]. Hamkins wrote:
“There are at least three distinct perspectives one can naturally take
on when undertaking work in nonstandard analysis. In addition, each
of these perspectives can be varied in two other dimensions, inde-
pendently. Those dimensions are, first, the order of nonstandardness
(whether one wants nonstandardness only for objects, or also for func-
tions and predicates, or also for sets of functions and sets of those and
so on); and second, how many levels of standardness and nonstandard-
ness one desires.”
We shall describe the three perspectives and discuss their similarities
and differences in Sections 3 through 5. The breakdown into three main
perspectives parallels that in Bair–Henry [9]. Sections 6 through 8
Y. Sergeyev [152], and D. Spalt [156]. These were dealt with respectively in Katz–
Sherry [102], Bascelli et al. [15], Kanovei–Katz–Sherry [87], Bair et al. [7], Borovik–
Katz [28], B laszczyk et al. [25], B laszczyk et al. [23], Bascelli et al. [16], B laszczyk
et al. [26], Gutman et al. [58], Katz–Katz [94].
6See e.g., a quotation in Delfini–Lobry [35] from Berkeley Physics Course, Craw-
ford [33] and Section 6.2.
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explore additional aspects of Robinson’s framework. The survey Benci–
Forti–Di Nasso [19] was an earlier effort in this general direction.
3. Construction perspective
Hamkins wrote:7 “In this perspective, one thinks of the nonstandard
universe as the result of an explicit construction. In the most basic
instance, one starts with the familiar ordered field of real numbers
〈R,+,×, <, 0, 1〉 and extends it to a larger ordered field.”
The larger field then necessarily contains infinitesimals and infinitely
large numbers. Constructing such an extension by itself is easy,8 but
not just any extension will do. In order for it to serve as a tool for
analysis, one needs at least to be able to extend every function f of
interest defined on R to a function ∗f defined on the larger field so
that ∗f⇂R = f . This extension is expected to preserve the important
properties of f (see Section 3.3 for an introductory discussion of the
Transfer Principle). We will sketch an ultrapower construction of such
a hyperreal extension R →֒ ∗R.
3.1. Ideal points in projective geometry. As a motivational com-
ment, it may be helpful to compare extending the field R to adding
ideal points at infinity in projective geometry.9 In projective geom-
etry, an affine plane defined by the equation ax + by + cz = d is
outfitted with an assortment of ideal points at infinity, one for each
pencil of parallel lines in the plane. The new points are viewed as
satisfying the “same” equation once one introduces homogeneous coor-
dinates ax1 + bx2 + cx3 = dx4. In addition to ideal points being added
to the ambient space, each substructure, namely each line, is similarly
enriched by the addition of one of these points. This is analogous to a
hyperreal extension presented below where not only the extension ∗R
itself has additional points, but every object, such as subset, or func-
tion, is similarly enriched.
At the beginning of the 17th century Johannes Kepler invoked a
principle of continuity to justify (at least) two distinct procedures: a
7The quotations in this section have been slightly edited.
8The simplest example of such an extension is the field of rational functions
(quotients of polynomials with real coefficients), linearly ordered by defining f < g
if and only if f(x) < g(x) for all sufficiently large x. Then real numbers are embed-
ded in it as constant functions, the function f(x) = 1x represents an infinitesimal,
and the function g(x) = x represents an infinitely large number. More advanced
examples are provided by Levi-Civita fields; see Lightstone–Robinson [112].
9Such an analogy is meaningful in the context of ordered fields, whereas the
addition of points at infinity in projective geometry makes sense for an arbitrary
field.
6 P.F., K. H., V. K., M. K., C. L., AND S. S.
continuous sweep of all conics aided by ideal points at infinity (a proto-
type of the modern theorem that all conics are projectively equivalent),
and a view of a circle (or more general curves) as an infinite-sided poly-
gon. The latter view found an avid adherent in the person of Gottfried
Leibniz, whose law of continuity postulated that the rules valid in the
finite realm remain valid in the infinite realm; see Section 7.5 and
Katz–Sherry [102] for additional details.
3.2. The ultrapower construction. Let RN denote the ring of in-
finite sequences of real numbers, with arithmetic operations defined
termwise. Then we have a totally ordered field
(3.1) ∗R = RN/MAX
where “MAX” is a suitable maximal ideal. To produce such a maximal
ideal, one can exploit a finitely additive measure ξ,
ξ : P(N)→ {0, 1}
(thus ξ takes only two values, 0 and 1) taking the value 1 on each
cofinite set, where P(N) is the set of subsets of N. For each pair of
complementary subsets of N, such a measure ξ “decides” in a coherent
way which one is “negligible” (i.e., of measure 0) and which is “domi-
nant” (measure 1).
The ideal MAX consists of all “negligible” sequences 〈un〉, i.e., se-
quences which vanish for a set of indices of measure 1, namely,
ξ
({n ∈ N : un = 0}) = 1.
The subset Uξ ⊆ P(N) whose members are sets of measure 1 is called
a free (or nonprincipal) ultrafilter.
Note the formal analogy between (3.1) and the construction of the
real numbers as equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational
numbers. In both cases, the subfield is embedded in the superfield by
means of the constant sequences, and the ring of sequences is factored
by a maximal ideal.
Elements of ∗R are called hyperreal numbers. The field R is embedded
into ∗R via a mapping that assigns to each r ∈ R the hyperreal ∗r,
namely, the equivalence class of the constant sequence with value r; we
shall identify r and ∗r. The equivalence classes of sequences with terms
from N form the set ∗N of hypernatural numbers. The equivalence class
of the sequence 〈n : n ∈ N〉 (respectively, 〈 1
n
: n ∈ N〉) is an infinitely
large integer (respectively, an infinitesimal).
The order ∗< on ∗R is defined by setting
[〈un〉] ∗< [〈vn〉] if and only if ξ({n ∈ N : un < vn}) = 1.
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This order extends the ordering < of R as follows: for r, s ∈ R, we
have r < s if and only if r ∗< s (that is, ∗r ∗< ∗s). Hence we can drop
the asterisk on < with no risk of confusion.
Addition ∗+ on ∗R is defined by
[〈un〉] ∗+ [〈vn〉] = [〈un + vn〉]
and similarly for multiplication. These operations extend the corre-
sponding operations on R, and hence the asterisks can and shall be
dropped. Moreover, ∗R, with these operations and ordering, is an or-
dered field extending R.
The equivalence classes of sequences with rational terms form the
subfield ∗Q consisting of hyperrational numbers.
A hyperreal number x is finite (or limited) if −r < x < r for
some r ∈ R, and infinitesimal if −r < x < r for all r ∈ R, r > 0. Every
finite hyperreal number x rounds off to the nearest real number, called
its shadow (or standard part) and denoted sh(x); here the difference x−
sh(x) is infinitesimal.
Similarly, the ultrapower construction allows one to extend arbitrary
functions and relations from R to ∗R. Every function f : R → R has
a natural extension ∗f : ∗R → ∗R acting componentwise: ∗f([〈un〉]) =
[〈f(un)〉]. If S ⊆ R, then the natural extension of S, denoted ∗S, is
defined by
[〈un〉] ∈ ∗S if and only if ξ
({n ∈ N : un ∈ S}) = 1;
similarly for relations on R. The asterisks are habitually dropped when
there is no risk of confusion; typically they are dropped for functions
and operations, but not for sets.
One of the first treatments of an ultrapower-type construction ap-
peared in Hewitt [71].
3.3. Transfer Principle. The Transfer Principle is a type of theorem
that, depending on the context, asserts that rules, laws or procedures
valid for a certain number system, still apply (i.e., are “transfered”)
to an extended number system. Thus, the familiar extension Q →֒ R
preserves the property of being an ordered field. To give a negative
example, the extension R →֒ R ∪ {±∞} of the real numbers to the
so-called extended reals does not preserve the field properties. the ex-
tension R →֒ C preserves the field axioms, but does not preserve the
property of not having a square root of −1.
The hyperreal extension R →֒ ∗R preserves all first-order properties.
The result in essence goes back to  Los´ [119].
For example, the identity sin2 x + cos2 x = 1 remains valid for all
hyperreal x, including infinitesimal and infinite inputs x ∈ ∗R. Another
8 P.F., K. H., V. K., M. K., C. L., AND S. S.
example of a transferable property is the property that
for all positive x, y, if x < y then
1
y
<
1
x
.
The Transfer Principle applies to formulas like that characterizing the
continuity of a function f : R→ R at a point c ∈ R:
(∀ε > 0)(∃δ > 0)(∀x)[ |x− c| < δ ⇒ |f(x)− f(c)| < ε];
namely, formulas that quantify over elements of R. See Lindstrøm [113],
Goldblatt [51], and Gordon–Kusraev–Kutateladze [55] for additional
details.
3.4. Elementary applications. Let H be an infinite hypernatural
number (more formally, H ∈ ∗N \ N) and z ∈ C. We retrieve formulas
of the sort that already appeared in Euler; see Bair et al. [7]. In the
following we will exploit hypercomplex numbers ∗C = ∗R +
√−1 ∗R.
For example we obtain
ez ≈ (1 + z
H
)H
where ≈ is the relation of infinite proximity.10 In particular, the iden-
tity eipi = −1 takes the form
(3.2)
(
1 + ipi
H
)H ≈ −1.
Since the principal branch of z 7→ H H√z is Lipschitz near z = −1,
it preserves the relation of infinite proximity there.11 Therefore the
relation (3.2) implies
H H
√−1 ≈ H + iπ
yielding the following formula for π:
π ≈ H
H
√−1−H√−1 .
This expression for π can be interpreted as the derivative of (−1)x
at x = −1
2
.12
10Here z ≈ w if and only if |z − w| is infinitesimal.
11Here we use the principal branch of the root. The point is that the Lipschitz
constant for the internal function in question can be chosen finite, since the Lip-
schitz constant does not depend on the index assuming that we work in a small
neighborhood of −1. Therefore the Lipschitz property with the same constant holds
by the Transfer Principle (see Section 3.3) for all infinite H , as well.
Alternatively, we have the primitive root H
√−1 = cos piH+i sin piH , henceH H
√−1 =
H cos piH + iH sin
pi
H ≃ H + ipi since cos piH ≃ 1 and Hpi sin piH ≃ 1.
12The derivative is computed from the definition, using the infinitesimal 1H .
The derivative of (−1)x is (ln(−1))(−1)x. We substitute x = − 1
2
to obtain pi
since ln(−1) = pii and (−1)−1/2 = −i.
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To mention another elementary application, the heuristic principle
that the period of small oscillations of the pendulum is independent of
their amplitude finds precise mathematical implementation for oscilla-
tions with infinitesimal amplitude Kanovei–Katz–Nowik [85]. A trans-
parent treatment of the Jordan curve theorem exploiting Robinson’s
framework appears in Kanovei–Reeken [91]. For additional applica-
tions see Section 6.13
3.5. Compactness, saturation. We have described the ultrapower
construction with respect to a fixed free ultrafilter U on the natural
numbers. Another way to implement these ideas is to use the compact-
ness theorem of first-order logic, as Robinson originally did in [141].
In some applications of nonstandard analysis one may wish to employ
stronger saturation properties (see below) than those satisfied by (3.1);
this can usually be accomplished by using special ultrafilters on larger
index sets.
The property of saturation of a hyperreal field is analogous to com-
pactness in classical analysis, and can be expressed as follows.
Definition 3.1. A hyperreal field ∗R is countably saturated if every
nested infinite sequence of nonempty internal sets (see Sections 4.1
and 4.2) has a common element.
More generally, a structure is called κ-saturated if for every collection
of properties (expressible in the language of the structure) of cardinality
strictly less than κ, each finite subcollection of which is satisfied by
some element of the structure, there is an element of the structure that
satisfies all of the properties simultaneously. Note that (3.1) is always
countably saturated.14
The existence of a common point for a decreasing nested sequence
of compact sets 〈Kn : n ∈ N〉 can be seen as a special case of the
saturation property. Indeed, the decreasing nested sequence of internal
sets, 〈∗Kn : n ∈ N〉, has a common point x by saturation. But for a
compact set Kn, every point of
∗Kn is nearstandard (i.e., infinitely close
to a point of Kn). In particular, sh(x) ∈ Kn for all n, as required.
Hamkins wrote in [65]: “To give a sample consequence of saturation,
we observe that every infinite graph, no matter how large, arises as an
induced subgraph of a hyperfinite graph in any sufficiently saturated
model of nonstandard analysis. This often allows one to undertake
13See also the references provided in note 3.
14Traditionally, countable saturation is the same as ℵ1-saturation, because a
collection of cardinality strictly less than ℵ1 is the same as a countable (including
finite, which is a trivial case anyway) collection.
10 P.F., K. H., V. K., M. K., C. L., AND S. S.
finitary constructions with infinite graphs, modulo the move to a non-
standard context.”
“The ultrapower construction can be extended to the power set of R
and its higher iterates.15 In the end, one realizes that one might as well
take the ultrapower of the entire set-theoretic universe V . One then
has a copy of the standard universe V inside the nonstandard realm ∗V ,
which one analyzes and understands by means of the ultrapower con-
struction itself.16 A few applications of nonstandard analysis exploit
not just a single ultrapower, but an ultrapower construction repeated
along some linear order. Such iterated ultrapower constructions give
rise to many levels of nonstandardness, a useful feature. Ultimately
one is led to adopt all of model theory as one’s toolkit.” [65]
4. Superstructure perspective
As Hamkins points out, before long, one wishes nonstandard ana-
logues of the power set P(R) and its higher iterates. We will now
implement this idea.
4.1. Ultrapower of the power set of R. Elements of the ultra-
power of P(R) are the equivalence classes of sequences 〈An : n ∈ N〉
of subsets An ⊆ R where sequences 〈An〉 and 〈Bn〉 are defined to be
equivalent if and only if we have {n ∈ N : An = Bn} ∈ Uξ.
The relation ∗∈ between x = [〈xn〉] in ∗R and [〈An〉] in the ultrapower
of P(R) is defined by setting
x ∗∈ [〈An〉] if and only if {n ∈ N : xn ∈ An} ∈ Uξ.
In this construction, the sets in the ultrapower of P(R) are not sub-
sets of ∗R (they are equivalence classes of sequences), and the member-
ship relation ∗∈ is not the usual membership relation ∈. Both of these
problems are solved by the following stratagem. With each equivalence
class [〈An : n ∈ N〉] in the ultrapower of P(R) we associate a subset A
of ∗R as follows:
x ∈ A if and only if x ∗∈ [〈An〉].
The subsets of ∗R associated with the members of the ultrapower
of P(R) in this way are called internal sets. The collection of all in-
ternal subsets of ∗R is denoted ∗P(R). We have ∗P(R) $ P(∗R). The
15See Section 4.
16However, this idea runs into technical issues. The standard universe V is not
a set, and the ultrapower of the membership relation in V is not well-founded. We
discuss the ways in which nonstandard analysis deals with these issues in Section 5.
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inclusion is strict because there are subsets of ∗R that are not internal;
for example, the subset R ⊆ ∗R is not internal.
In the special case when An = S ⊆ R for all n ∈ N, the associ-
ated internal set is the natural extension of S introduced earlier and
denoted ∗S. We shall also refer to ∗S as the standard copy of S.
Definition 4.1. A hyperfinite set X is an internal set associated with
the equivalence class of a sequence 〈An : n ∈ N〉 where each An is finite.
Such a set admits an internal enumeration by a hypernatural number,
denoted |X|. In more detail, the hypernatural number |X| is the coset
of the sequence of integers |An| where |An| is the ordinary number of
elements in the finite set An.
It can be shown that every subset of ∗R definable in ∗R∪ ∗P(R) from
internal parameters is internal, a fact known as the internal definition
principle. Thus, if one defines a new object by a formula exploiting
only internal objects, the new object is necessarily internal, as well.
For instance, if one defines T to be the set of integers between 1 and
an infinite hyperinteger H , then T is necessarily internal. Thus one
needn’t specify a presentation of the internal set T with respect to the
ultrapower construction.
The Transfer Principle now applies to formulas that quantify over
both elements and sets of elements of R. Such statements transfer
into statements true about all internal sets, but not necessarily about
all sets. Thus for example every nonempty internal set of hyperreals
bounded above has a supremum in ∗R, but not every set of hyperreals
does.17
This construction can easily be extended to the second and higher
iterates of the power set operation. But the few examples already given
indicate that, for the practice of analysis, it suffices to know that an
extension of the standard structure exists, with suitable properties,
such as the Transfer Principle; the actual construction is of secondary
importance.
The superstructure framework enables one to step back from the
details of the actual (ultrapower) construction.18 It is still the most
popular vehicle for the practice of nonstandard analysis; see for example
17The subset R ⊆ ∗R is a counterexample: it is bounded above by every positive
infinitely large number L, but it does not have a least upper bound: if L is an upper
bound for R, then L− 1 is similarly an upper bound.
18Such a perspective is comparable to the way mathematicians think of real
numbers. They certainly wish to know that real numbers can be conceived as
equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rationals. However, he also wishes to be
able to ignore the actual construction of R entirely in his everyday work, and to
12 P.F., K. H., V. K., M. K., C. L., AND S. S.
Robinson–Zakon [144], Chang–Keisler [30], Albeverio et al. [1]. We
describe it in the next subsection.
4.2. The superstructure framework. For any set of individuals X ,
the superstructure over X is obtained from X by taking the power
set countably many times. In more detail, one defines the superstruc-
ture recursively by setting V0(X) = X , Vn+1(X) = Vn(X) ∪ P(Vn(X))
for n ∈ ω, and Vω(X) =
⋃
n<ω Vn(X).
The superstructure framework for nonstandard analysis consists of
two superstructures, Vω(X) and Vω(Y ) where X $ Y are infinite sets,
and a mapping ∗ : Vω(X) → Vω(Y ) such that ∗a = a for all a ∈
X , ∗X = Y , and A ∈ B implies ∗A ∈ ∗B for A,B ∈ Vω(X). From now
on, we take X = R. This facilitates comparison with the construction
perspective; meanwhile the discussion in this section applies fully to
the general situation. Note that Vω(R) contains all objects of interest
to classical analysis, such as the fields of real and complex numbers, the
higher-dimensional spaces Rn and Cn, functions on these, collections
of functions, Hilbert spaces ℓ2 and L2, functionals, etc.
We shall refer to Vω(R) as the standard universe and to Vω(∗R) as the
nonstandard universe. Thus, every set S in the standard universe Vω(R)
has a standard copy ∗S in the nonstandard universe (cf. Sections 3.2
and 4.1). The sets contained in Vω(
∗R) that are elements of some ∗S
for S ∈ Vω(R) are called internal, and ∗Vω(R) denotes the collection
containing the elements of ∗R together with all internal sets; we refer to
it as the internal universe. Note that ∗Vω(R) =
⋃
n<ω
∗Vn(R). We have
a proper inclusion ∗Vω(R) $ Vω(∗R); for example, R ⊆ ∗R is not an
internal set. Obviously, Vω(R) ⊆ Vω(∗R), but all sets in Vω(R), except
for the hereditarily finite ones, are external (not internal).
The main principle that connects the two superstructures is the
Transfer Principle, which posits that any property expressible in the
language of the superstructures by a bounded quantifier formula19 holds
in the standard universe Vω(R) about some objects if and only if it holds
for the standard copies of those objects in the internal universe ∗Vω(R)
or, equivalently, in the nonstandard universe Vω(
∗R).
By the Transfer Principle, 〈∗R, ∗+, ∗×, ∗<, 0, 1〉 is a field of hyperreals
with the properties as in Section 3.2. In particular, ∗R contains non-
standard numbers, such as infinitesimals and infinitely large numbers.
consider real numbers as individuals (atomic entities) and R simply as a complete
ordered field.
19A bounded quantifier formula is a formula where all quantifiers have the
form (∃x ∈ y) or (∀x ∈ y).
APPROACHES TO ANALYSIS WITH INFINITESIMALS 13
Many arguments in nonstandard analysis rely on a saturation prin-
ciple (see Definition 3.1). Two useful forms of saturation available in
the superstructure framework are the following:
(1) If A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ . . . are nonempty internal sets, then
⋂
n<ω
An 6= ∅.
(2) If {Ai : i ∈ I} is a collection of sets in Vω(R) possessing the
finite intersection property, then
⋂
i∈I
∗Ai 6= ∅.
We shall not give any details of the construction of superstructure
frameworks. The advantage of this approach lies precisely in the fact
that there is no need to do so. One can accept the framework and pro-
ceed to use it in any area of mathematics, while leaving its construction
to specialists. Such constructions proceed along the lines of Section 4.1;
see [30]. The internal universe ∗Vω(R) is isomorphic to the union of the
ultrapowers of Vn(R) for all n ∈ ω;20 the nonstandard universe Vω(∗R)
contains additional, external sets.
4.3. An application: Loeb’s construction of Lebesgue measure.
As an example of the interplay between the various kinds of sets in the
superstructure, we describe a nonstandard construction of the Lebesgue
measure on [0, 1] due to P. Loeb [117] (with an improvement that seems
to have appeared first in Hrbacek [75]).
We fix an infinite integer N ∈ ∗N. Let ti = iN for i = 0, . . . , N .
The hyperfinite set T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN} (see the sentence following
Definition 4.1) is referred to as “hyperfinite time line” in Albeverio et
al. [1]. Let µ be the counting measure on T , i.e., µ(X) = |X|/|T | for
each internal set X ⊆ T ; then µ itself is also internal. For every A ⊆
[0, 1], the set
sh−1[A] = {z ∈ ∗[0, 1] : sh(z) ∈ A}
is the, generally external, set of all z ∈ ∗[0, 1] such that z ≈ x for
some x ∈ A. Finally, we define
mL(A) = inf
{
sh(µ(X)) : X ⊆ T is internal and sh−1[A] ∩ T ⊆ X
}
.
The collection in braces is a (nonempty, bounded below) subset of R, so
the infimum exists. It can be shown (see [1] for some details) that mL
is the Lebesgue outer measure on [0, 1]; in particular, a set A ⊆ [0, 1] is
Lebesgue measurable if and only if one has mL(A)+mL([0, 1]rA) = 1,
and in this case mL(A) is precisely the Lebesgue measure of A.
20More precisely, to the bounded ultrapower of Vω(R).
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4.4. Axiomatizing. It is often thought worthwhile (for example, for
pedagogical reasons; see [99]) to develop the subject purely from gen-
eral principles that make the nonstandard arguments succeed. This
approach is similar to, say, deriving results from the axioms for alge-
braically closed fields rather than arguing about these mathematical
structures directly. As an example of such an exposition, Keisler’s cal-
culus textbook is based on five simple axioms A through E that hold
in every superstructure framework; see Keisler [107] and [105].
The next step would be to take the entire universe of sets, V , as
a “superstructure.” We already indicated that this move gives rise to
some issues, both technical and fundamental.21 It is considered in the
next section.
5. Axiomatic perspective
5.1. Nonstandard set theories. As mentioned above, taking an ul-
trapower of the entire set-theoretic universe V is an attractive idea.
Since V is not a set in ZFC, the best way to handle this construction is
axiomatic. The earliest axiomatizations of ultrapowers of V were pro-
posed by Petr Vopeˇnka in [167] as part of his project of axiomatizing the
method of forcing. The first nonstandard set theories that extend ZFC
and can serve as a framework for the practice of nonstandard analysis
were developed independently by Hrbacek [74] and Nelson [127].22 We
refer to Kanovei–Reeken [92] for a comprehensive survey of the field.
Nonstandard set theories typically possess the set membership pred-
icate ∈ and a unary predicate of standardness st; here st(x) reads
“x is standard.” The analog of st(x) in the superstructure framework
is “x is a standard copy.”
A helpful classification tool is a distinction between internal and
external set theories.
Internal set theories axiomatize only the standard and internal sets.
Edward Nelson’s IST is the best known example. The theory IST
postulates all the axioms of ZFC in the pure ∈-language, together
21While the ultrapower of Vn(R) for n ∈ ω is well-founded, and hence isomorphic
to a transitive set, by the Mostowski collapse lemma, when one takes the ultrapower
of Vω(R), or even of the entire V , the membership relation ∗∈ is non-well-founded,
and therefore the ultrapower is not isomorphic to a transitive set or class in the
framework of ZFC. This situation calls for an ontological commitment beyond what
is required by ZFC, and is best handled axiomatically.
22Vopeˇnka also developed a nonstandard set theory that enables infinitesimal
methods. His Alternative Set Theory (AST) is incompatible with ZFC and is not
considered here. See Sochor [155] and Vopeˇnka [166].
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with three extra axioms (more precisely, axiom schemata) of Idealiza-
tion, Standardization, and Transfer, which govern the relations between
standard and nonstandard sets. The theory is particularly attractive
because of its simplicity. Kanovei [84] modified IST by limiting its uni-
verse to bounded sets.23 The resulting internal theory BST24 provides
the same mathematical tools as IST, but it has better metamathemat-
ical behavior; see Section 5.5.
5.2. The axioms of BST. We shall now formulate the axioms of
BST. The notation (∃stx) . . . and (∀stx) . . . abbreviates respectively
the formulas (∃x)(st(x) ∧ . . .) and (∀x)(st(x) ⇒ . . .). The nota-
tion (∀stfina) . . . is shorthand for the formula
(∀a) ((st(a) ∧ (a is finite))⇒ . . . ) .
The axioms of BST include those of ZFC (with Separation and Replace-
ment only for formulas in the ∈-language) together with the following
four additional principles.
Boundedness.
(∀x)(∃sty)(x ∈ y).
This means that every set is an element of some standard set. This
is the main difference between BST and IST. In IST there is a set that
contains all standard sets as elements.
Bounded Idealization.
(∀stA) [(∀stfina ⊆ A)(∃y)(∀x ∈ a)Φ(x, y) ≡ (∃y)(∀stx ∈ A)Φ(x, y)]
where Φ(x, y) is any formula in the ∈-language, possibly with param-
eters.
This axiom is a version of saturation or compactness; see Defini-
tion 3.1. Loosely speaking, if a collection of properties Φ(x, y), x ∈ A is
finitely satisfiable, that is, for every standard finite set a = {x1, . . . , xn}
of elements of A there is some y such that Φ(x1, y)∧. . .∧Φ(xn, y) holds,
then there is some y that satisfies Φ(x, y) simultaneously for all stan-
dard x ∈ A. As a basic example, consider the property
(i, j ∈ N) ∧ (i < j).
For every standard finite set a = {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ N there is j ∈ N such
that (i1 < j) ∧ . . . ∧ (in < j) (namely, take j = max{i1, . . . , in} + 1).
Hence by Bounded Idealization there exists an element j ∈ N such
23A set is bounded if it is an element of a standard set.
24BST was explicitly formulated in [84]. Implicitly it is equivalent to the theory
of internal sets in some of the theories developed in Hrbacek [74]; see Section 5.4.
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that i < j for all standard i; i.e., j is an infinitely large natural number.
Transfer.
(∃x)Φ(x) ≡ (∃stx)Φ(x)
where Φ(x) is any formula in the ∈-language, with standard parame-
ters.
An equivalent version of Transfer is that any statement Φ(a1, . . . , an)
(in the ∈-language) about standard sets a1, . . . , an is true when inter-
preted in the standard universe if and only if it is true when interpreted
in the internal universe. This is a modern version of Leibniz’s Law of
Continuity ; see Section 3.1.
Standardization. For each formula Φ(z) in the (st,∈)-language, pos-
sibly with parameters, we have the following:
(∀stX)(∃stY )(∀stz)(z ∈ Y ≡ z ∈ X ∧ Φ(z))
No axiom of Separation for arbitrary formulas in the (st,∈)-language
is imposed by BST; for example, the collection {n ∈ N : st(n)} is not
a set.25 In its place one has the Standardization principle, to the effect
that for any property Φ(x) expressible in the (st,∈)-language and any
standard set X there is a standard set Y that contains exactly those
standard elements of X that have the property Φ. (But Y and Φ do
not have to agree on nonstandard elements of X .) Two simple but im-
portant consequences of the BST axioms, especially of Standardization,
are the following:
(1) If k, n ∈ N, n is standard, and k < n, then k is also standard;
and
(2) If x is a finite real number (i.e., |x| < n for some standard n ∈
N), then there is a (unique) standard real number r such that
r ≃ x (such an r is called the standard part of x or the shadow
of x).
25More precisely, BST (as well as IST) proves that there is no set x equal to N′ =
{n ∈ N : st(n)}. Entities like N′, that is, those defined as {x ∈ X : Φ(x)}, where X
is a true set and Φ is a formula in the (∈, st)-language, are called external sets (or
sometimes semisets), and typically they are non-sets in BST and IST, unless st can
be eliminated in some fashion.
Yet BST allows for an implicit introduction of external sets by means of a certain
coding defined in [90]. This coding system involves not only external sets of internal
elements like the collection of all standard integers N′ above, but also external sets
of external sets, etc. This results in the construction of a universe of Hrbacek’s
external set theory HST, which extends the given BST universe in the same way
that the complex numbers extend the real line by means of representation of a
number a+ bi as a pair 〈a, b〉 of real numbers a, b. See [90] or [92, Chapter 5].
APPROACHES TO ANALYSIS WITH INFINITESIMALS 17
We first prove (2). Assume |x| < n for some standard n ∈ N. By
Standardization, there is a standard set Y such that
(∀stz)(z ∈ Y ≡ z ∈ R ∧ z < x).
Note that Y 6= ∅ (since −n ∈ Y ) and Y is bounded above by n. By
completeness ofR, Y has a supremum r, and by Transfer, r is standard.
We now show that x ≃ r, so r is the standard part of x. If not,
then |r − x| > s > 0 for some standard s. This means that either
x > r + s or x < r − s. In the first case, r + s ∈ Y , contradicting
r = supY . In the second case, r − s is an upper bound on Y , again
contradicting r = supY .
Now we show that (1) follows from (2). Since k is assumed to be
finite, it has a standard part r. Then k is the unique integer in the
standard interval [r − 0.5, r + 0.5), so k is standard by Transfer.
We note that Boundedness is a single axiom while Bounded Ideal-
ization, Standardization, and Transfer are axiom schemata, that is,
they apply to an arbitrary formula Φ (of a certain type); in this they
resemble the schemata of Separation and Replacement of ZFC.
The schemata of Standardization and Transfer are common with
IST. The schema of Bounded Idealization is weaker than the full Ide-
alization of IST, but the Boundedness axiom makes up for it, adding
a more comprehensive control over the interactions between standard
and internal sets in the BST set universe than it is possible in IST.
5.3. Connection with ultrafilters. Let us clarify the connection of
these axioms with ultrafilters. Working in BST and given an internal
set x and a standard ultrafilter U , we say that
x is in the monad of U if x ∈ A for all standard A ∈ U .
Note that, for x in the monad of U , x is nonstandard if and only if U
is nonprincipal.
From Boundedness and Standardization it follows that for every x
there is a standard ultrafilter U such that x is in the monad of U .
From Bounded Idealization it follows that for every standard ultra-
filter U there is an x such that x is in the monad of U . This is a version
of saturation.
In fact, for somewhat stronger versions of these statements (the Back
and Forth properties, Hrbacek [79, Section 5]), the implications can be
replaced by equivalences.
As a consequence, the axiom schemata of BST can actually be re-
placed by single axioms. Thus BST is finitely axiomatizable over ZFC;
see Kanovei–Reeken [92, Section 3.2].
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The connection goes deeper. Assuming that x is in the monad of U ,
where U is a standard ultrafilter on a standard set I, we have a map-
ping that assigns to (the equivalence class modulo U of) each standard
function f on I the internal set f(x). This mapping is an isomorphism
between the standard ultrapower of V modulo U , with the ∗∈-relation,
and the class {f(x) : f is standard } of internal sets, with the ∈-relation
[92, Section 6.1].
5.4. External theories. Two theories proposed in Hrbacek [74] and
assigned acronyms HST and NST in Kanovei–Reeken [92] are external
set theories. They are formulated in the (int, st,∈)-language, where int
is a unary predicate of internality (here int(x) reads “x is internal”).
The internal part of these theories satisfies BST, but they admit also
external sets. This makes them more powerful, but also more complex.
The two theories differ in the properties of the universe of all (internal
and external) sets. It turns out that this universe cannot satisfy all the
axioms of ZFC. Thus, HST allows Replacement (and even its stronger
version, Collection), while NST makes available Power Set and Choice.
The theory KST proposed in Kawai [103] extends IST by external
sets. Andreev and Gordon developed the nonstandard class theory
NCT [3]. Roughly speaking, NCT is to BST what the von Neumann–
Go¨del–Bernays set theory is to ZFC; in particular, NCT has standard,
internal and external classes.
The work of Nelson and his followers demonstrated that a lot of
nonstandard mathematics can be carried out by internal means alone;
see Section 6.2. External sets are necessary for some more advanced
constructions, such as Loeb measures.
There are also nonstandard set theories that do not fit into our two-
way classification of axiomatic approaches that well; we mention only
the α-theory proposed in Benci–Di Nasso [18] and the framework for
nostandard analysis developed in ZFC with the axiom of Foundation re-
placed by the axiom of Superuniversality, by Ballard and Hrbacek [11].
5.5. Consistency, conservativity and intuitive interpretation.
Each of these theories is known to be an equiconsistent and conserva-
tive extension of ZFC. Here conservativity means that any ∈-sentence
provable in the nonstandard theory is already provable in ZFC; the
converse is clearly true as well.
Therefore one might expect that each model of ZFC can be embed-
ded, as the class of all standard sets, into a model of the nonstandard
theory. However, this is false for IST; see Kanovei–Reeken [92, 4.5].
In fact ZFC has to be strengthened, for instance by adding the global
choice axiom and the truth predicate for ∈-formulas, in order to be
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able to embed its model, as the class of standard sets, into a model of
IST; see [92, 4.6]. For NST this expectation is also false, but it is true
for BST as well as for HST.
We pointed out already that an ultrapower of V is non-well-founded,
and hence in ZFC there is no mapping of the ultrapower of V onto some
transitive class that would convert the membership relation ∗∈ in the
ultrapower into a true ∈-relation. Briefly, the membership relation in
the ultrapower is not the actual membership relation ∈, and cannot be
converted to it in the framework of ZFC. Since nonstandard set theories
axiomatize ultrapowers or iterated ultrapowers, they transcend ZFC;
an intuitive picture of the universe of such a theory properly extends
the familiar ZFC universe V .
A question then arises to determine what the place of V is in this
larger picture. In a discussion of this issue, we have to distinguish
between two meanings of the word standard. On one hand, there is
the technical meaning; standard objects are the objects in the scope of
the predicate st. On the other hand, the expression standard objects
is sometimes used to refer to the objects that cousin Georg and many
traditional mathematicians are familiar with as the objects from the
ZFC universe V . These two meanings do not necessarily coincide; in
order to perform a disambiguation, we will refer to the standard objects
in this second sense as the familiar objects.
5.6. The three pictures. At this point, there are several choices. One
can identify the internal numbers and sets with the familiar numbers
and sets. Standard reals and sets (i.e., those in the scope of st) are
on this view only some of the mathematical entities with which we are
familiar, singled out for special attention. One can call this view the
internal picture. It is the view adopted in Nelson [127]. We discuss it
in detail in Section 7.2.
However, one can equally well regard the standard numbers and sets
as the familiar numbers and sets, with the understanding that stan-
dard sets may contain also (what are referred today as) nonstandard
elements, or (as Leibniz might have called them) ideal elements or use-
ful fictions ; see Section 7.5. One can call this view the standard pic-
ture. It is proposed in Hrbacek [75]. In the superstructure framework,
it would correspond to viewing the standard copies as the familiar ob-
jects. Analogously, in projective geometry an affine plane is outfitted
with an assortment of ideal points at infinity; see Section 3.1.
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External set theories admit yet another picture, the external picture.
In these theories one can single out the class of well-founded sets.26
These are generally external. There is a one-one ∈-preserving map-
ping ∗ of the well-founded sets onto the standard sets. One then has
the option of regarding the well-founded sets as the intuitively familiar
objects, and everything else as ideal. In this view, mathematics can be
developed in a way similar to the superstructure framework, with the
universe of all well-founded sets in place of Vω(R). This picture was
outlined in an appendix to Hrbacek [75] and is fully implemented in
Kanovei–Reeken [92].
5.7. The Protozoa metaphor. The following analogy may be helpful
in interpreting the three pictures of Section 5.6. Here we are thinking
of each real number as an individual (as one does in the superstructure
approach). Let us assume we are familiar with the class of animals, and
then someone invents the microscope and we discover the protozoa; are
we to count them as animals? There are three possible answers.
(1) (External picture) Protozoa are not animals because they fall
outside what we previously meant by the word ‘animal’, but we
can invent a new word, ‘hyperanimal,’ to include animals and
protozoa.
(2) (Standard picture) Protozoa are animals and were so all along;
there is no change in the meaning of ‘animal’. The familiar
class of animals contains unfamiliar species like protozoa in ad-
dition to the familiar ones. The microscope allows us to see
new animals (animals that are new to us, that is).
(3) (Internal picture) Protozoa are animals, and they were famil-
iar all along, even though we weren’t aware of them specifi-
cally. What is new is our ability to distinguish between micro-
scopic and macroscopic animals: this is what the microscope
provides.27
5.8. The intuitive interpretation. The following three points need
to be kept in mind.
1. The choice of the nonstandard set theory does not commit one to
a particular picture. Nelson used the internal picture, and hence this
picture is usually considered an intrinsic part of IST, but IST is equally
26A set A is transitive if any x ∈ A satisfies x ⊆ A. A set X is well-founded if
there is a transitive set A such that X ⊆ A and the restriction of the ∈-relation
to A is well-founded. In ZFC all sets are well-founded, but external nonstandard
set theories necessarily have also ill-founded sets.
27The allusion to Keisler’s microscope Keisler [107] is of course intentional.
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compatible with the standard picture. The theory and the picture are
two separate things. The choice of the picture is not a mathematical is-
sue, since one will get exactly the same mathematical results regardless
of the picture, but rather a matter of personal preference.
2. Cousin Georg would likely object to both the internal and the
standard picture, on the grounds that numbers and sets as developed
around 1872 not long before the 1886 Patent-Motorwagen (see Sec-
tion 1), i.e., the entities he feels comfortable with, do not fit either in
his opinion.
In the case of the internal picture the issue is that, intuitively, every
nonempty collection of natural numbers has a least element. Now in
a nonstandard set theory like IST there is no set of all nonstandard
natural numbers. This may run counter to cousin Georg’s expectations
concerning the properties of the familiar numbers along the lines of
the CD+II mindset (see Section 2.2), where every definite property of
natural numbers should necessarily determine a set. Note that st is
treated as a definite property in nonstandard set theory: for each x,
either st(x) or ¬st(x).
In intuitive terms, we can consider st to be an indefinite, vague
property like heap in the paradox of sorites. This indefiniteness is
reflected in the formal theory by the nonexistence of the corresponding
set. The resistance to this idea is due to an inherent tendency to
abstract (form collections).
Cousin Georg’s objection to the standard picture is that the familiar
set N just does not contain any ideal elements. A counter-argument is
that one can think as if it did. The problems connected with collections
of ideal natural numbers without the least element are also perhaps
less pressing in this picture. (A personal anecdote: The recent book
Hrbacek–Lessman–O’Donovan [81] was first written in the internal pic-
ture, which was strongly objected to by some of the referees–perhaps
cousin Georg among them. Eventually a switch to the standard picture
was implemented, and the book was accepted immediately afterward.)
3. The external picture seems to be the least objectionable from the
point of view of cousin Georg (in fact, there seems to be no obvious
reason why it should be objectionable at all), but the necessity to
work with external sets (in addition to the standard and internal ones)
complicates the framework.
A discussion of these various pictures can be found in Hrbacek [77].
5.9. Relative standardness. Arguably, there is not much current
mathematical work in nonstandard analysis that actually uses more
than one level of standardness. In the superstructure framework, we
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know only of an early paper Molchanov [126], employing two levels.
Perhaps one reason for this paucity is that the model-theoretic frame-
work with more than one level of standardness quickly becomes un-
manageable because it naturally involves complex combinations of ul-
trapowers to take care of all the details.
As for the axiomatic framework, there are two distinct approaches.
The first approach is to define different levels or degrees of standard-
ness within a given nonstandard universe of discourse, e.g., a universe
satisfying Nelson’s internal set theory IST or its BST (bounded set
theory) version; see Section 5.1 and Section 5.2.
There are several meaningful approaches to defining relative stan-
dardness in this setting. Among them are the following three:
(1) (most natural but not most useful) A set y is standard with
respect to x if there is a standard map f such that x ∈ domf
and y = f(x); see e.g., Gordon [53].
(2) (following [53]) A set y is standard with respect to x if there is
a standard map f such that x ∈ domf , all values of f are finite
sets28 and y ∈ f(x).
(3) (following Kanovei [84, Section 3], based on earlier ideas of Lux-
emburg [121] and Hrbacek). If κ is a standard cardinal then
one defines sets of order κ as those belonging to standard sets
of cardinality κ or less.
These and similar definitions lead to the internal subuniverses as dis-
cussed in Kanovei–Reeken [92], that is, classes I of internal sets satis-
fying the following: if x1, . . . , xn ∈ I, where n is a standard number, f
is a standard function, and the string 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 belongs to domf
then f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ I. Each such an internal subuniverse I can be
considered as a new degree of standardness, that is, the class of all sets
standard in the new sense.
Chapter 6 in [92] is devoted to these notions and contains several re-
sults related to properties of these generalized notions of standardness.
The second approach to relative standardness is to introduce this
complex notion axiomatically, rather than explicitly defining it in a
given nonstandard universe. The advantage of this approach is that all
the axioms of BST can be relativized to each level of standardness.
The idea to treat levels of standardness axiomatically was proposed
by Wallet (see Pe´raire and Wallet [134]) and fully developed by Pe´raire
[132]. Pe´raire’s axiomatic theory RIST is an extension of IST to many
levels of standardness. Besides ∈, its language contains a binary relative
28Finiteness in IST corresponds to hyperfiniteness in the model-theoretic
approach.
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standardness predicate ⊑; one can read x ⊑ y as “x is standard relative
to y.” Thus the class {x : x ⊑ y} is the level of standardness determined
by y. The number 0 (or any other object definable without parameters)
determines the coarsest level of standardness, which can be identified
with the standard sets of IST.
In RIST one can have a finite sequence of numbers, for example
η0, η1, η2, where η0 is infinitesimal and each of the other terms is
infinitesimal relative to the level of standardness determined by the
preceding one. Tao writes:
Having this hierarchy of infinitesimals, each one of which
is guaranteed to be infinitesimally small compared to
any quantity formed from the preceding ones, is quite
useful: it lets one avoid having to explicitly write a lot of
epsilon-management phrases such as “Let η2 be a small
number (depending on η0 and η1) to be chosen later”
and “. . . assuming η2 was chosen sufficiently small de-
pending on η0 and η1”, which are very frequent in hard
analysis literature, particularly for complex arguments
which involve more than one very small or very large
quantity. Tao [158, p. 55]
While it is straightforward to iterate levels of standardness count-
ably many times, or even along any a priori given linear ordering, it
is harder to produce satisfactory frameworks that have sequences of
levels of standardness of arbitrary hyperfinite length. This is done in
Hrbacek [76] and [79]. In such a framework (the theory GRIST) one
can have a hyperfinite sequence of natural numbers where each term
is nonstandard relative to the previous one. Tao speculated that this
feature might be useful in the proof of Szemere´di’s theorem, but the
only use of it thus far seems to be a characterization of higher-order
differentiability in Hrbacek [78]. See also [161] for a use of the language
of nonstandard analysis in order to avoid a large number of iterative
arguments to manage a large hierarchy of parameters.
The axiomatic framework is used in several papers of Pe´raire (see
e.g., [133]), as well as Gordon [54], the more recent work of Di Nasso
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[39], and in [81] (these works use infinitely many levels of standard-
ness).29 The axiomatic framework hugely simplifies the presentation.
While RIST and GRIST are internal theories, there are also external
theories with many levels such as SNST by Fletcher [46] and EST by
Ballard [10].
5.10. Constructive aspects of Robinson’s framework. The dis-
cussion in some of the earlier sections may have given an impression
that nonstandard analysis depends on ultraproducts or some similar
model-theoretic techniques, and therefore is essentially non-effective.
Errett Bishop and Alain Connes30 have both claimed that nonstandard
analysis is somehow fundamentally non-constructive and non-effective.
These claims are fundamentally flawed and have been debunked as
follows.
5.10.1. Abstract analysis. Methods of nonstandard analysis are often
applied in areas that are inherently non-constructive, such as general
topology, the theory of Banach spaces, or Loeb measures; we refer to
them here as abstract analysis. The nonstandard settings that one
needs for abstract analysis are of course also non-constructive, and do
imply the existence of ultrafilters. For example, in IST−, a theory
obtained from IST by deleting the Axiom of Choice, one can prove
the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem (Every filter can be extended to
an ultrafilter).31 However, the approach not involving nonstandard
analysis (if it exists) is equally non-constructive. A detailed example of
this phenomenon in the work of Connes may be found in [88].
5.10.2. Nonstandard Peano Arithmetic theories. Classical mathemati-
cal results generally do not require the full power of set theory, whether
standard or nonstandard. Let PA be (the axiomatic theory of) the
Peano arithmetic, which naturally axiomatizes the natural numbers N,
and, for each n, let PAn be the n-th Peano arithmetic, a theory which
29In the simplest case one has a nested chain of classes Nst0 ⊆ Nst1 ⊆ Nst2 ⊆
· · · ⊆ N, where Nst0 = Nst can be identified with the standard natural numbers
and N is the set of all natural numbers. Thus the higher the n, the less standard
the integers of Nstn are. In fact the ordering of the levels of standardness does not
have to be of type ω. It can be more complicated, have infinite descending chains,
even be dense, but it has to have a least element Nst0 .
30See the references in note 5.
31It may be interesting to note that one cannot prove the full Axiom of Choice;
so even the nonstandard abstract analysis, to the extent it is supported by IST−,
is actually more “constructive” than the standard abstract analysis carried out in
ZFC. See Hrbacek [80] and Albeverio et al. [1, p. 31] for a related discussion.
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naturally axiomatizes the structure which contains the set of natu-
ral numbers N along with its consecutive power sets P(N), P2(N) =
P(P(N)), . . . , Pn−1(N), so that PA itself is PA1.
The ideas similar to those described for ZFC, can also be applied
to define a nonstandard version ∗PAn of each PAn. The relations
among these theories (between standard and nonstandard versions for
the identical and different values of n) were thoroughfully studied in
Henson–Keisler [70] and some related papers. In particular, it was es-
tablished that each ∗PAn is comparable in terms of its strength rather
with the standard theory PAn+1 than with its direct standard base
PAn.
5.10.3. Constructive nonstandard mathematics. There is extensive work
by Palmgren, Avigad [6], Martin-Lo¨f [125], van den Berg et al. [162], on
constructive nonstandard mathematics; see Palmgren [131] for a bib-
liography of the early contributions. These references introduce both
syntactic and semantic approaches to nonstandard analysis which are
constructive in the sense of Bishop’s constructive analysis and Martin-
Lo¨f’s constructive type theory, i.e., based on intuitionistic logic.
5.10.4. Effective content and reverse mathematics. Classical nonstan-
dard analysis actually contains a lot of easily accessible effective con-
tent as follows. Sanders [149] establishes that one can algorithmically
convert a proof of a theorem in “pure” nonstandard analysis (i.e., for-
mulated solely with nonstandard axioms and nonstandard definitions
of continuity, compactness, differentiability, etc.) into a proof of the
constructive/effective version of the associated classical theorem.
This work is done in an axiomatic framework (some fragment of
full nonstandard set theory) and always produces effective (and even
constructive) results when Transfer and Standardization are not used.
The use of the former gives rise to relative computability results in the
spirit of Reverse Mathematics, while the use of the latter (or saturation)
translates into results computable modulo bar recursion [109]. Osswald
and Sanders discuss the constructive content of nonstandard analysis at
length in [130], and Sanders [150] discusses how these results undermine
the Bishop–Connes critique.
5.10.5. Tennenbaum’s theorem. At first glance, even fragments of Ro-
binson’s framework based on arithmetic may seem fundamentally non-
constructive from the viewpoint of Tennenbaum’s theorem. The theo-
rem literally states that any nonstandard model of Peano Arithmetic is
not computable. What this means is that for a nonstandard model M
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of Peano Arithmetic, the operations +M and ×M cannot be com-
putably defined in terms of the operations +N and ×N of an intended
model N of Peano Arithmetic. Similar results exist for fragments; see
Kaye [104, § 11.8].
Now, while certain nonstandard models do require non-constructive
tools to build, models are not part of Nelson’s axiomatic approach
IST or its variant BST (see Section 5.2). Furthermore, IST and BST
specifically disallow the formation of external sets like “the operation +
restricted to the standard numbers.” Nelson called attention to this
rule on the first page of [127] introducing IST: “We may not use external
predicates to define subsets. We call the violation of this rule illegal
set formation” (emphasis in original).
Thus, one of the fundamental components of Tennenbaum’s theo-
rem, namely the external set “+ restricted to the standard naturals”
is missing from the internal set theories IST and BST, as the latter
exclusively deal with internal sets. Arguably, therefore, Tennenbaum’s
theorem is merely an artifice of the model-theoretic approach to non-
standard analysis.
The critique by Connes of Robinson’s framework is based on sim-
ilarly flawed assumptions, namely that the models generally used in
Robinson’s framework are fundamentally non-constructive and there-
fore so is nonstandard analysis. It is worth pondering the fact that non-
constructive mathematics is routinely used in physics (see e.g., the dis-
cussions of the Hawking–Penrose singularity theorem and the Calabi–
Yau manifolds in [95], undecidability of the spectral gap [34]), without
scholars jumping to the conclusion that physical reality is somehow
non-constructive.
6. Physics: Radically elementary modeling
6.1. Tao on intricate results. Tao wrote in Compactness and con-
tradiction as follows:
The non-standard proofs require a fair amount of gen-
eral machinery to set up, but conversely, once all the
machinery is up and running, the proofs become slightly
shorter, and can exploit tools from (standard) infini-
tary analysis, such as orthogonal projections in Hilbert
spaces, or the continuous-pure point decomposition of
measures. Tao [159, p. 168]
Here Tao is referring to the fact that if one works from the construction
perspective (as he does), then the entire ultrapower construction counts
as part of the general machinery. Meanwhile,
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. . . for particularly intricate and deep results it can hap-
pen that non-standard proofs end up being simpler over-
all than their standard analogues, particularly if the
non-standard proof is able to tap the power of some
existing mature body of infinitary mathematics (e.g.,
ergodic theory, measure theory, Hilbert space theory,
or topological group theory) which is difficult to di-
rectly access in the standard formulation of the argu-
ment. [159, p. 169]
Edward Nelson would have likely subscribed to Tao’s view as expressed
above, but may have added that there is another side of the coin which
is what we shall refer to as Radically Elementary Modeling. This term
alludes to Nelson’s book Radically Elementary Probability Theory [128].
6.2. The physicist’s vibrating string. We are interested in develop-
ing a mathematical model of a vibrating string. First we will illusrate
the viewpoint of a physicist by providing some quotations. In the cel-
ebrated Berkeley Physics Course (vol. 3), Frank Crawford writes:
(Sec. 2.1) If a system contains a very large number of
moving parts, and if these parts are distributed within
a limited region of space, the average distance between
neighboring moving parts become very small. As an
approximation, one may wish to think of the number
of parts as becoming infinite and the distance between
neighboring parts as going to zero. One then says that
the system behaves as if it were “continuous”. Implicit
in this point of view is the assumption that the motion of
near neighbors is nearly the same. Crawford [33, p. 48]
The next quotation deals with a uniform beaded string having N beads
and with fixed ends:
(Sec. 2.2) We now consider the case where N is huge, say
N = 1, 000, 000 or so. Then for the lowest modes (say
the first few thousand), there are very large number of
beads between each node. Thus the displacement varies
slowly from one bead to the next [We shall not consider
here the highest modes, since they approach the “zigzag
limit”, where a description using a continuous function
is not possible.] (ibid., p. 51)
Furthermore,
(Sec. 2.4) In sec. 2.2 we considered a continuous string. . .
In this section we will find the exact solutions for the
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modes of a uniform beaded string having N beads and
with fixed ends. In the limit that we take the numbers
of beads N to to be infinite (and maintain the finite
length L), we shall find the standing waves that we stud-
ied in Sec. 2.2. Our purpose is not merely that, however.
Rather, we shall find that, in going to the limit of a con-
tinuous string, we discarded some extremely interesting
behavior of the system. (ibid., p. 72)
These comments would be considered by traditionally trained mathe-
maticians as an “informal discourse of a physicist.” But for a mathe-
matician trained in nonstandard analysis, they can be easily translated
into a perfectly formalized mathematical text.
6.3. The hyperfinite vibrating string. We will now formalize Craw-
ford’s approach in Nelson’s IST. Let ΣN be the following system of
differential equations:
(6.1)
ΣN


dxj
dt
= yj(t), j = 1, . . . , N − 1
dyj
dt
= K
2
h2
(xj−1(t)− 2xj(t) + xj+1(t)), j = 1, . . . , N − 1
x0(t) = xN(t) = 0
where N · h = 1.
Assuming K = 1, from elementary calculus we know that the solu-
tions are given by the following equations:
(6.2) xj(t) = Σ
N−1
n=1 un cos(ωnt) +
vn
ωn
sin(nπjh),
where
(6.3)
ωn =
2
h
sin
(nπh
2
)
un = 2hΣ
N−1
k=1 xn(0) sin(kπnh)
vn = 2hΣ
N−1
k=1 yn(0) sin(kπnh)
In classical mathematics one considers the continuous wave equation:
(6.4) Σ


∂2X
∂t2
(z, t) =
∂2X
∂z2
(z, t)
X(0, t) = X(1, t) = 0
to be “the model” and proves the existence of solutions (t, z) 7→ X(t, z),
continuous with respect to t and z wich satisfy (6.4); if one is interested
in computer simulations it can be proved that suitable solutions of the
discrete (6.1) converge in some sense to a solution of (6.4) when N
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tends to infinity. By the way, in classical mathematics, the system
(6.1) is usually viewed as an approximation of (6.4).
But in nonstandard analysis we can consider (6.1) to be “the model”
provided that N is nonstandard (infinite). Explicit formulas (6.2) still
stand. Typically a physicist is less interested in the existence of solu-
tions than in their properties. For instance he might be interested in
the “shape” of the string at time t, namely, in the aspect of the “dotted
line” in [0, 1]× R:
(6.5)
{
(n dz, un(t)) : n = 0, 1, . . . , N
}
with dz = h. An important question is whether the “dotted line” seems
continuous. (The physicist asks “whether the displacement varies slowly
from one bead to the next”). The mathematical formalization is the
following.
Definition 6.1. The “dotted line” (6.5) is said to be S-continuous if:
k dz ≈ 0 =⇒ un+k(t) ≈ un(t).
The S-continuity of the initial condition xn(0); n = 0, 1, · · ·, N is
insufficient to imply the S-continuity of the solution. What is required
in addition is that the initial energy
E(0) =
1
2
N−1∑
k=1
(
xn+1(0)− xn(0)
h
)2
h +
N−1∑
k=1
yn(0)
be limited. In fact consider an initial condition such that xn(0) = 0;
if an unlimited energy at time t = 0 is contained in the unlimited
modes λn it turns out that after some duration all this energy will
concentrate at some point and “break” the solution; for details see
Delfini–Lobry [35]. It is one of the interesting aspects of the behavior
of the system that we can observe when we do not discard high modes.
Notice that in the preceding lines one uses only the Idealization axiom
of IST.
If one wishes to make the connection with the continuous model,
one uses the shadow of the “dotted line” whose definition uses the full
strength of the Standardization axiom. Then it can be proved under
suitable asumptions on the initial conditions (including limited energy)
that the shadow of the “dotted line” is the graph of a differentiable
function ϕ(t, z) which is a solution of (6.4).
We acknowledge that our example is very simple and that physicists
did not await Robinson to understand all the information contained in
formulas (6.2) and (6.3).
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6.4. Hyperfinite Brownian motion. This point of view was advo-
cated in Nelson [128] (a less elementary approach using Loeb mea-
sures was pioneered in Anderson [2]), where Nelson defined the Brow-
nian motion as a discrete random walk of infinitesimal step size at
times 0, dt, 2dt, . . . , kdt, . . . , Ndt = 1, with dt infinitesimal. Namely,
we set
ξ0 = 0; ξt+dt = ξt + zt
√
dt
where zt is a sequence of independent random variables taking the
values +1 or −1 with probability 1
2
. The probability space for such a
process is just the (hyper)finite set Ω = {−1,+1}N with its σ-algebra
equal to P (Ω). A trajectory of this Brownian motion is defined as the
mapping t 7→ xt with domain in what Nelson refers to as the near-
interval, namely the hyperfinite set {0, dt, 2dt, . . . , kdt, . . . , Ndt = 1}.
The important point here is that despite its discrete definition, which
fits well with the intuition that “at each instant one chooses at random”
(notice that in the limit dt → 0 this concrete meaning is lost), the
notion of continuity is perfectly defined by S-continuity (see above).
Then Nelson proves the following:
Almost surely, a trajectory of the Brownian motion is
S-continuous.
Here almost surely means that for every standard ε > 0 the (external)
set of trajectories that are not S-continuous is contained in a (true)
set of probability less than ε. This result is obtained within a very
light subsystem of IST (just Idealization is needed). The title of Rad-
ically Elementary Probability Theory delivers on its promise. In fewer
than 80 pages, starting from the early beginnings including nonstan-
dard analysis and some basics of probability theory, the mathematical
model for the physical Brownian motion is constructed. Moreover the
last chapter called The de Moivre–Laplace–Lindeberg–Feller–Wiener–
Le´vy–Doob–Erdos–Kac–Donsker–Prokhorov theorem provides a large
amount of modern results on stochastic processes. It is the decision
not to replace clear nonstandard statements by wordier conventional
paraphrases that makes things elementary. Let us quote Nelson’s Pref-
ace, paragraphs 2 and 3:
This work is an attempt to lay new foundations for prob-
ability theory, using a tiny bit of nonstandard analysis.
The mathematical background required is little more
than which is taught in high school, and it is my hope
that it will make deep results from the modern theory
of stochastic processes readily available to anyone who
can add, multiply and reason.
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What makes this possible is the decision to leave the re-
sults in non-standard form. Nonstandard analysts have
a new way of thinking about mathematics, and if it is
not translated back into conventional terms then it is
seen to be remarkably elementary. Nelson [128, p. vii]
(emphasis ours)
At the next stage, in order to connect elementary results to classical
ones, the full IST system is used to prove the (formal) mathematical
equivalence of the hyperfinite model with the classical Wiener process.
Let us quote again from Nelson:
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that
theorems of the conventional theory of stochastic pro-
cesses can be derived from their elementary analogues
by arguments of the type usually described as general-
ized nonsense; there is no probabilistic reasoning in this
appendix. This shows that the elementary nonstandard
theory of stochastic processes can be used to derive con-
ventional results. . . [128, p. 80]
Nelson goes on to make the following additional point:
. . . on the other hand, it shows that neither the elab-
orate machinery of the conventional theory nor the de-
vices from the full theory of nonstandard analysis, needed
to prove the equivalence of the elementary results with
their conventional forms, add anything of significance:
the elementary theory has the same scientific content
as the conventional theory. This is intended as a self
destructing appendix.32 Nelson [128]
This view regarding stochastic processes was extended to diffusion:
ξ0 = 0; ξt+dt = ξt + f(ξt)dt+ zt
√
dt
in Benoˆıt [20], to stochastic analysis as applied to finance in van den
Berg [164], and to complex physical particle systems in Weisshaupt
[170], [171]. In a similar vein, Lobry [115], Lobry–Sari [116] advocate
32Nelson’s cryptic comment calls for a clarification. What Nelson is apparently
referring to is the fact that the conventional formalism for random walks in par-
ticular and stochastic analysis in general, as developed by Kolmogorov and others,
relied on elaborate machinery based on measure theory. Nelson viewed the replace-
ment of elaborate machinery by radically elementary considerations as a positive
scientific development, which however has self-destructing aspects as far as the work
of the traditional practitioners themselves is concerned.
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viewing ODEs with discontinuous right hand side on the basis of a sim-
ple Euler scheme with infinitesimal step. The path of Radically Elemen-
tary Modeling was also pursued in Diener–Lobry [37], Harthong [66],
Fliess [47] and other works.
7. More on Nelson
Bien que tous les
mathe´maticiens ne le
reconnaissent pas, il existe
une “re´alite´ mathe´matique
archa¨ıque”. Comme la re´alite´
du monde exte´rieur, celle-ci
est a priori non organise´e,
mais re´siste a` l’exploration et
re´ve`le une cohe´rence. Non
mate´rielle, elle se situe hors
de l’espace-temps.
A. Connes [31]
The idea that there is a pure
world of mathematical
objects (and perhaps other
ideal objects) totally divorced
from our experience, which
somehow exists by itself is
obviously inherent nonsense.
M. Atiyah [5, p. 38]
We first give a more detailed discussion of the II hypothesis outlined
in Section 2.2.
7.1. Kleene, Wang, Putnam, and others on the II. Many set
theorists think of the semantics of set theory as given in terms of an
intended model or intended interpretation, in accordance with a realist
philosophy of mathematics; for details see Maddy [122]. Intended inter-
pretations concern not merely the natural numbers but, more generally,
purported entities in something described as “a mathematical practi-
tioner’s universe,” “primordial mathematical reality” (a term coined by
A. Connes), or the like. Concerning such II hypotheses, Kleene wrote:
APPROACHES TO ANALYSIS WITH INFINITESIMALS 33
Since a formal system (usually) results in formalizing
portions of existing informal or semiformal mathemat-
ics, its symbols, formulas, etc. will have meaning or
interpretations in terms of that informal or semiformal
mathematics. These meanings together we call the (in-
tended or usual or standard) interpretation or interpre-
tations of the formal system. Kleene [108, p. 200]
In a similar vein, Hao Wang writes:
The originally intended, or standard, interpretation takes
the ordinary nonnegative integers {0, 1, 2, . . .} as the do-
main, the symbols 0 and 1 as denoting zero and one, and
the symbols + and · as standing for ordinary addition
and multiplication (see section “Truth definition of the
given language” in Wang [169]).
An intended model could be defined as one that “reflects our intu-
itions [about natural numbers] adequately” Quinon–Zdanowski [138,
p. 313] (emphasis added). Haim Gaifman writes:
Intended interpretations are closely related to realistic
conceptions of mathematical theories. By subscribing to
the standard model of natural numbers, we are commit-
ting ourselves to the objective truth or falsity of number-
theoretic statements. . . . Realism and intended inter-
pretations are thus intimately related; often they are
treated as the same problem. Gaifman [48, p. 15]
Thus the II hypothesis entails that N obtains a detailed reference in
the ordinary counting numbers. Meanwhile, Robinson wrote: “math-
ematical theories which, allegedly, deal with infinite totalities do not
have any detailed . . . reference.”33 [142, p. 42]
Weber claimed to quote34 Leopold Kronecker as positing an allegedly
immutable status of the integers “whereas everything else is the work
of man.” Weber’s quote is often misattributed to Kronecker himself.
However, Kronecker specifically wrote, on the contrary, that numbers
were a creation of the human mind, and contrasted numbers that are
human artefacts, with space and time which he felt were outside the
mind (possibly following the traditional pre-Einsteinian philosophers):
The principal difference between geometry and mechan-
ics on one hand, and the other mathematical disciplines
33A related point was made by Salanskis; see note 37.
34The adage Weber reports in Kronecker’s name is known not to appear in any
of Kronecker’s writings; see Ewald [44, p. 942, note a].
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we comprehend under the name of arithmetic, consists
according to Gauss in this: the object of the latter, num-
ber, is a pure product of our mind, while space as well
as time has reality also outside of our mind which we
cannot fully prescribe a priori. Kronecker [110, p. 339]
See also Gauthier [49, p. 163]. Hilary Putnam doubted our ability to fix
an intended interpretation and seemed to treat the II as a throwback
to Kantian noumena [136, p. 482].35 For responses to Putnam see e.g.,
Horsten [73], Gaifman [48].
7.2. Predicate on the familiar real line. In the internal view of
IST, rather than thinking of the standard sets as being the familiar
ones, embedded in a larger nonstandard world, one essentially thinks
of the nonstandard universe as the familiar world (in the terminology of
Section 5.5), with standard structures being picked out of it by means
of a suitable predicate.
On this view, one has the real numbers including both infinite and
infinitesimal reals, and one can say when two finite real numbers have
the same standard part, etc. In this picture, we think of the familiar
real line as what in the other picture would be the nonstandard one,
and then we have a predicate on that, which corresponds to the range
of the star map in the other approach. So some real numbers are
standard, and some functions are standard and so on.
Hamkins wrote: “One sometimes sees this kind of perspective used
in arguments of finite combinatorics, where one casually considers the
case of an infinite integer or an infinitesimal rational.” That kind of
talk may seem alien to cousin Georg (see Section 1), but for those who
adopt the picture it is useful. In a sense, one goes the whole nine yards
into the nonstandard realm until it turns familiar.
There are several characterisations of Nelson’s framework. Each
characterisation employs a slightly different philosophical starting point.
Peter Loeb’s position as expressed in [118, p. vii] is that (1) Nelson is
working exclusively in the nonstandard universe, and (2) there is no
standard world in this setting. This second point is of course mathe-
matically correct to the extent that the predicate st violates the axiom
35Putnam’s comment there about “noumenal waifs” indicates an impatience with
the typical post-Dedekind mathematician’s assumption that N finds a detailed ref-
erence in the ordinary intuitive counting numbers. Putnam seems to view the
latter as inaccessible noumena, the mathematician’s identification of N with these
noumena as an unwarranted assumption, and the search for the intended interpre-
tation as a futile search for parenthood for the said waiflike noumena. See further
in note 37.
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of separation. As far as the first point is concerned, it involves a bit of
an equivocation on the meaning of the word standard :
(a) its technical meaning in the context of Robinson/Nelson, and
(b) the meaning of ordinary/usual.
The equivocation is disambiguated in Section 5.5. In line with the
CD+II mindset (see Section 2.2), cousin Georg (see Section 1) would
bridle at the idea that the ordinary/usual real line should contain
infinitesimals in any sense, and so Loeb is correct in this sense, as
well. Other experts in nonstandard analysis point out a complemen-
tary mathematical point that is also valid, namely the following.
Nelson demonstrated that infinitesimals can be found within the or-
dinary real line itself in the following sense. Infinitesimals are found
in the real line by means of enriching the language through the intro-
duction of a unary predicate st and postulating an axiom schema (of
Idealization), one of most immediate instances of which implies the ex-
istence of infinitely large integers and hence nonzero infinitesimals, as
in his 1977 article; see Katz–Kutateladze [97] for a related discussion.
Recall that Nelson’s framework Internal Set Theory (IST) is a conser-
vative extension of ZFC. In other words, the entire package goes over,
including each article published in the Annals of Mathematics so long
as it makes no use of Sarah’s switch (see Section 1) st.
To put it more colorfully, infinitesimals were there all along, but
cousin Georg hasn’t noticed them.
7.3. Multiverse. Hamkins [61], [62] proposes a view of the founda-
tions of mathematics where there are many distinct concepts of set,
each instantiated in the corresponding set-theoretic universe These
works formulate a number of principles that the multiverse should sat-
isfy. An interesting observation for our purposes is that the following
principle is compatible with Hamkins’s multiverse.
Principle B: For every ZFC universe V in the multiverse
there is a class S ⊆ V such that all the axioms of the
theory BST hold in (V,∈, S).
In other words, given any universe V and a class S as above, the
predicate st = stV,S defined by
st(x) if and only if x ∈ S
distinguishes some elements of V as standard, in a way that makes
BST hold, without adding any new elements to V . Thus Nelson’s
claim that the infinitesimals have been there all along without being
noticed (see Section 7.2) is literally true in this framework, though in
the context of BST rather than Nelson’s original theory IST. For the
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benefit of readers familiar with model theory and BST, we give some
technical underpinnings of these claims. Victoria Gitman and Hamkins
construct a “toy” model of the multiverse axioms in ZFC; see [50]. We
show that Principle B holds in this model.
Theorem 7.1. The Gitman–Hamkins model satisfies the Principle B.
Outline of proof. One can start with the fact that a standard core in-
terpretation for BST is definable in ZFC (Kanovei–Reeken [92, Theo-
rems 4.1.10(i) and 4.3.13]), where the expression “standard core” in-
dicates that the universe V of ZFC is isomorphic to the universe of
standard sets in the interpretation.
An immediate corollary [92, Corollary 4.3.14] is that for every model
(M,∈M) of ZFC there is a corresponding model (N,∈N , SN) of BST,
in which the class of standard sets SN is isomorphic to M .
The multiverse of Gitman and Hamkins consists of all countable
computably saturated models of ZFC. It is easy to see that if (M,∈M)
is countable and computably saturated, then also the corresponding
(N,∈N , SN) is countable computably saturated. Furthermore, (N,∈N)
and (M,∈M ) have the same theory and the same standard system.
Hence they are isomorphic [50, Key Lemma 6]. If S is the image of SN
under such an isomorphism, then (N,∈N , SN) and (M,∈M , S) are also
isomorphic. In particular, (M,∈M , S) satisfies BST. 
It is not known whether BST can be replaced by Nelson’s IST in
this argument; see the related discussion in Section 5.5. Essentially the
same argument works for the theory GRIST (see Section 5.9) starting
with the fact that a standard core interpretation for GRIST is definable
in ZFC, Hrbacek [80].
Theorem 7.2. One can consistently assume that every universe of
ZFC in the multiverse can be stratified into many levels of relative
standardness by a binary relation ⊑ in such a way that all the axioms
of GRIST hold in (V,∈,⊑).
7.4. Switches. Hamkins [63], [64] discusses the concept of switches,
exemplified by the continuum hypothesis (CH). Here the terminology
of switch implies that it can be turned on or off at will. Similarly, using
modern techniques of forcing, one can pass from a model of ZFC that
satisfies CH to one that satisfies ¬CH and vice versa.
The availability of the predicate st in the language is also a type of
switch. Namely, all models of ZFC can be built up into models of BST,
turning the switch on as it were. Meanwhile, the forgetful functor (just
forget about the switch in the glove compartment) takes you from BST
back to ZFC.
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The analogy with switches is that one model has infinitesimals, while
the other doesn’t. This is analogous to one model possessing a set of
intermediate cardinality between N and NN, and the other not. Both
switches arguably challenge the II hypothesis; see Section 2.2.
Now st is a different type of switch, but whatever the situation may
be for the ontology and epistemology of switches, Sarah’s switch implies
(not merely that one can fly faster than drive but) that the discovery of
the switch leaves all theorems in place, so that Nelson’s real numbers
can be viewed as the familiar ones, and the infinitesimals have been
there all along without being noticed–even though the familiar model
from the last third of the 19th century apparently didn’t have them.
7.5. Historical antecedents. The view that numbers come in more
than one flavor is closely parallel to the dichotomy of assignable vs
inassignable quantities (the latter being viewed as useful fictions) in
Leibnizian calculus; see Bair et al. [8] and Bascelli et al. [16] for more
details. Even earlier, Fermat’s technique of adequality exploited proce-
dures using E in a striking anticipation of later infinitesimal techniques;
see [100]. Meanwhile L. Carnot spoke of quantite´s de´signe´es and quan-
tite´s auxiliaires in 1797; see Barreau [12, p. 46, 53].
Stolz, du Bois-Reymond, and others were working on infinitesimals
at the end of the 19th century, and had they joined forces with Frege or
Peano to conceive an axiomatisation that would actually incorporate
Leibniz’s assignable vs inassignable distinction, 20th century mathe-
matics may have looked different. This viewpoint involves being able
to conceive of the history of mathematics as something other than in-
evitable march toward Weierstrassian epsilontics and Cantor–Dedekind
reals. In more precise philosophical terms, it involves envisioning the
history of mathematics in terms of the Latin model rather than the
butterfly model, to borrow the terminology from Ian Hacking [59].
To comment on Hacking’s distinction between the butterfly model
and the Latin model, we note the contrast between a model of a deter-
ministic biological development of animals like butterflies, as opposed
to a model of a contingent historical evolution of languages like Latin.
Hacking’s dichotomy applies to the development of the field of mathe-
matics as a whole. Some scholars view the development of mathematics
as a type of organic process predetermined genetically from the start,
even though the evolution of the field may undergo apparently sudden
and dramatic changes, like the development of a butterfly which passes
via a cocoon stage which is entirely unlike what it is pre-destined to
produce.
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The Latin model acknowledges contingent factors in the develop-
ment of an exact science (mathematics included), and envisions the
possibility of other paths of development that may have been followed.
For example, had an axiomatic formalisation of infinitesimals been pro-
posed earlier, it might have been incorporated into the early formali-
sations of set theory, and spared us the inanity of the Cantor–Russell
anti-infinitesimal vitriol, reflecting the state of affairs in mathematical
foundations during the second half of the 19th century; for additional
details see [102].
Hacking’s perspective is at odds with some of the received history of
mathematical analysis. A related point is made by P. Mancosu in the
following terms:
the literature on infinity is replete with such ‘Whig’ his-
tory. Praise and blame are passed depending on whether
or not an author might have anticipated Cantor and nat-
urally this leads to a completely anachronistic reading of
many of the medieval and later contributions. Mancosu
[123, p. 626]
In his critique of intuitionism, Bernays introduced a distinction related
to assignable/inassignable in terms of accessible vs inaccessible:
Brouwer appeals to intuition, but one can doubt that
the evidence for it really is intuitive. Isn’t this rather an
application of the general method of analogy, consisting
in extending to inaccessible numbers the relations which
we can concretely verify for accessible numbers? As a
matter of fact, the reason for applying this analogy is
strengthened by the fact that there is no precise bound-
ary between the numbers which are accessible and those
which are not. Bernays [21] (translation by Charles Par-
sons)
Thus, we obtain infinitesimals as soon as we assume that (1) there are
assignable/standard real numbers, that obey the same rules as all the
real numbers, and (2) there are real numbers that are not assignable.
Of course, neither Leibniz nor Carnot employed any set-theoretic no-
tions to specify an ontology of their infinitesimals, but their procedures
find better proxies in modern infinitesimal frameworks than in mod-
ern Weierstrassian ones.36 In more technical terms, one considers the
36The procedures vs ontology distinction is dealt with in greater detail in the
articles Borovik–Katz [28], Bair et al. [7], Bascelli et al. [16], B laszczyk et al. [24],
B laszczyk et al. [25].
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ordinary ZFC formulated in first order logic, and adds to it the unary
predicate st and the axiom schemata.
Robinson’s framework has enabled a reappraisal of the procedures
of the pioneers of infinitesimal analysis. For a broad outline of such a
program see the studies [8] (2013), [27] (2013), [15] (2014), [25] (2017).
Specific scholars studied include
• Stevin in [96] (2012);
• Gregory in [17];
• Fermat in [100] (2013);
• Leibniz in [101] (2012), [102] (2013), [153] (2014), [16] (2016),
[24] (2017);
• Euler in [87] (2015), [7] (2017);
• Cauchy in (Laugwitz [111]) and in [94] (2011), [28] (2012).
8. Reeb, naive integers, and ClaimQ
Georges Reeb’s position regarding the use of infinitesimals was de-
veloped in his essay entitled La mathe´matique non standard vieille de
soixante ans? There are two distinct versions of the essay, [139] (1979)
and [140] (1981). The 1979 version of the essay was reprinted in Salan-
skis [148]. The book gives an account of the constructivist view of
Reeb. Reeb was closely associated with J. Harthong in his philosophy
of mathematics. They published the article Intuitionnisme 84 [67] in
the book Barreau–Harthong [14]. One can distinguish at least three
distinct approaches to the problem of motivating a non-naive integer
in Reeb, as detailed in the next three sections. See also Lobry [114],
Diener–Diener [36, p. 4].
8.1. Nonformalizable intuitions. Reeb’s position concerning naive
integers can perhaps be described as follows. The naive integers are
those integers that all members of humanity share before they un-
derstand any advanced mathematics. Such naive integers are already
present in any formal language since language is necessarily a succes-
sion of symbols, rather than an unordered collection of symbols.
If one accepts a formal language (e.g., that of ZF) with respect to
which N is defined, one must accept also that one understands the
following informal reasoning:
• We recognize “1” of N as the naive one;
• We recognize “2” of N as the naive two;
• etc.
• If we recognize “n” of N as the naive n then we recognize “n+1”
of N as the naive n plus one.
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Reeb then argues that an assertion to the effect that every element
of N is naive is not supported by any formal mathematics, and arrives
at his
“Claim Q”: The naive integers don’t fill up N.37
Thus claim Q is at tension with the CD+II mindset (see Section 2.2).
To anyone familiar with model theory, Reeb’s “claim Q” could eas-
ily be interpreted in terms of the existence of nonstandard models
of the natural numbers, whether in PA or ZF, first constructed in
Skolem [154]. However, Reeb [139] takes a more “fundamental” at-
titude and seems to argue for his “claim Q” somehow from first prin-
ciples, the naive integers being taken to be available before a commit-
ment to formal mathematics. Reeb comments that being naive is not
a mathematical concept, hence not formalizable; hence they cannot be
said to fill up N.
8.2. Ideal intruders. In [140], Reeb takes a different tack, and argues
that any infinitary construction in mathematics, as recognized at least
since Hilbert [72], necessarily introduces ideal elements not intended
by initial naive intuitions:
D. Hilbert - pour nous en tenir a` un seul nom - a montre´
clairement, dans son ce´le`bre article sur l’infini, com-
ment la formalisation (par exemple N,R, . . .) de notions
concre`tes (les entiers de tout le monde, les points du
continu intuitifs) introduit ne´cessairement, en quelque
sorte contre la vigilance du formalisateur d’abondants
objets ide´aux, non de´sire´s. Reeb [140, p. 149]
Reeb goes on to refer to such elements as “des intrus ide´aux ine´vitables
lors de la formalisation.”
8.3. Link between intuitionism and nonstandard analysis. In
the book Diener–Reeb [38, Chapter 9], Reeb provides yet another ac-
count of a non-naive integer in an intuitionistic setting, in terms of the
size of a hypothetical solution to xn+yn = zn (this was before A.Wiles;
of course Fermat’s last theorem can be replaced by a conjecture that
is still open).
37Reeb’s term in the original French was Constat Q which we loosely translate as
Claim Q fully aware of the inadequacies of such a translation. The difficulty of the
term was analyzed by Salanskis, who noted: “Le proble`me du remplissement de N
par les naifs est totalement de´nue´ de sens si l’on ne joue pas le jeu de reˆver que les
formalismes suscitent des re´fe´rents.” Salanskis [147] (translation: “The problem of
filling N by the naive integers is totally meaningless if one is not playing the game
of dreaming that formalisms generate referents.”)
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Surprising as it may seem to the uninitiated, the French school of
nonstandard analysis draws a direct connection between Brouwer’s in-
tuitionism and nonstandard analysis. We refer to Diener–Reeb [38,
Chapter 9] and Harthong–Reeb [67] for a detailed discussion, while we
sketch the motivation for this connection as follows.
L. E. J. Brouwer was the founder of intuitionism, the first school
of constructive mathematics; the latter aims to provide a computa-
tional foundation for mathematics based on the Brouwer–Heyting–
Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation of logic.
To identify a part of classical mathematics as not-acceptable in in-
tuitionistic mathematics, Brouwer introduced a technique which would
later be called “Brouwerian counterexamples;” see Mandelkern [124]
for an overview.
Such counterexamples come in strong and weak flavors and are meant
to cast doubt on the constructive/intuitionistic acceptability of a given
theorem or axiom. A weak Brouwerian counterexample against the law
of excluded middle (LEM) is as follows:
A ∨ ¬A is not acceptable (under the BHK interpreta-
tion) because there is no algorithm to decide whether
A = ‘Goldbach’s conjecture’ is false or not (or any as-
yet unproved conjecture).
However, Goldbach’s conjecture has been verified using computers
up to very large numbers. Thus, there is the possibility, discussed at
length in [67], that Goldbach’s conjecture is false, but that the coun-
terexample cannot be constructed (in principle and/or in practice).
Hence, Goldbach’s conjecture would be “true in the real world”, but
false in principle. Here, the real world could be either “the physical
world” or the world of constructive mathematics, according to [67].
In other words, all the natural numbers one can construct (in prin-
ciple or in practice) do satisfy Goldbach’s conjecture, but “there are
out there” numbers which do not. Following [67], one could refer to
the former (constructive) numbers as naive integers (satisfying Gold-
bach’s conjecture) and to the others as non-naive. Now, Goldbach’s
conjecture is just one example, and there will always be unsolved con-
jectures, so the previous idea is persistent in that sense. The above
reasoning is how one could interpret the adage by Reeb and Harthong
that “the naive integers do not fill up N” based on Brouwer’s weak
counterexamples to LEM.
Meanwhile, the observation that “the naive integers do not fill up N”
is the basic motivation for having nonstandard numbers in [67], and we
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observe how Brouwer’s intuitionism motivates the existence of nonstan-
dard numbers, especially in the sense of Nelson’s IST.
8.4. Nelson-style motivations. There are Nelson-style motivations
for such a claim Q but they don’t seem to be the same as Reeb’s. There
are various motivations for why naive integers shouldn’t exhaust N.
One of them is in terms of a multitude that’s too vast to be expressed
by even a computer the size of the universe running the entire time
allotted to our civilisation and exploiting the fastest growing functions
in our logical arsenal including superbusy beavers. Such a number
could function as infinite for all practical purposes at the naive level.
This indicates a useful lack of homogeneity of N and a promise of
a richer structure which is better captured in terms of an enriched
syntax as in Nelson’s system, which singles out standard (or assignable)
elements out of N by means of a single-place predicate violating the
separation axiom.
8.5. Quantum intuitions. The breakdown of infinite divisibility at
quantum scales poses an undeniable challenge to the CD+II mentality
(see Section 2.2). It makes physically irrelevant a literal reading of
the mathematical definition of the derivative in terms of limits as ∆x
tends to zero, since attempting to calculate the derivative for incre-
ments below the Planck scale would yield physically meaningless re-
sults. Rather, quotients like ∆y
∆x
need to be taken in a certain range, or
at a suitable level. Attempts to formalize Planck’s ℏ as an infinitesi-
mal go back at least to Harthong [66], Werner–Wolff [172]. The article
Nowik–Katz [129]38 developed a general framework for differential ge-
ometry at level λ. In the technical implementation λ is an infinitesimal
but the formalism is a better mathematical proxy for a situation where
infinite divisibility fails for physical reasons, and a scale for calculations
needs to be fixed accordingly.
If one accepts Reeb’s “Claim Q,” then any non-naive integer can
be described as infinite in the sense that it is greater than any naive
integer. Once one forms the field of fractions, the inverse of such an
infinite integer in this sense becomes an infinitesimal.
38In his technical report for the CNRS in 1985, Alain Connes wrote: “La
se´duction de l’analyse non standard est due en grande partie a` la cre´ation d’un
vocabulaire suggestif; la ge´ome´trie diffe´rentielle s’est bien garde´e de ce´der a` cette
tentation, etc.” (cited in Barreau [13, p. 35]). Had we been aware of Alain Connes’s
seductive comment at the time we might have subtitled our article [129] “Differen-
tial geometry reduced at last.”
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9. Conclusion
While mathematicians may not always think of set theory as being
dynamic, such a switch in foundational thinking is helpful in appreci-
ating the advantages of the framework developed by Robinson, Nelson,
and others.
Just as the automobiles have gotten better over the past 130 years,
so also there is room for improvement as far as the 1870 set-theoretic
foundations are concerned. The automobile industry is dynamic and
flexible willy-nilly (if you don’t innovate, your competitors will) but
the received, and outdated, views on set theory seem to have cornered
the market like an intended monopoly, alluded to in Section 7.1. Au-
tomobiles today have numerous options, from fuel injection, 4-wheel
drive, convertible, and GPS to more futuristic ones like lift-off abilities
to various degrees, with broad agreement as to the general utility of
such options some of which have become part of the standard package.
We argue in favor of inclusion of the infinitesimal option as part of the
core package of set-theoretic foundations.
A natural place to start would be in education, so as to restore in-
finitesimals to the calculus curriculum, as in Cauchy’s classroom at
the Ecole Polytechnique. Accordingly, over the past few years we have
trained over 400 freshmen using Keisler’s infinitesimal calculus text-
book [107], and summarized the results in the study Katz–Polev [99].
At the high school level infinitesimal calculus has been taught in Geneva
for the past twelve years, based on the approach developed in [81].
In addition to serving as a fruitful tool for what Leibniz called the Ars
inveniendi, Robinson’s framework has occasioned a deepened reflection
on mathematical foundations in general and the meaning of number in
particular.
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